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Abstract
This paper analyses the signaling effect of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) statements
related to its asset purchase programme (APP) on market expectations for the future path of
short-term interest rates in the euro area. Considering a broad set of event days and daily
changes in euro area stock indices as surprise reactions to the statements, an event-study
analysis is employed to capture the changes in country-specific short-term interest rate
expectations, as extracted from an effective lower bound (ELB) consistent shadow-rate term
structure model. The empirical results generally support the presence of signaling effects
in the euro area, but the estimated effectiveness of the channel has a considerable degree of
uncertainty. Regarding country-specific differences, the reaction of interest rate expectations
in the periphery countries tends to be stronger for dovish APP statement surprises, and thus
these countries may benefit more from the signaling channel. Lastly, the responses of interest
rate expectations to APP statement surprises are found to vary considerably depending on the
identification strategy of the APP statements, which ultimately shows that these conclusions
based on the empirical results are likely to be fragile.
Keywords: Quantitative Easing, Asset Purchase Programme, European Central Bank,
Shadow-Rate Term Structure Model, Signaling Channel
1 Introduction
Starting after the global financial crisis, central banks in many advanced economies
have been setting policy rates at record low levels. As conventional monetary policy
lost its power to lower short-term interest rates and yields of financial assets at the effec-
tive lower bound (ELB), central banks began to pursue a policy of purchasing substan-
tial quantities of financial assets, a policy commonly known as quantitative easing (QE),
aimed at lowering long-term interest rates to ease financial conditions and stimulate the
economy.
On 22 January 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) joined other central banks in
carrying out QE through its Asset Purchase Programme (APP) in order to combat the
ongoing economic downturn and historically low inflation in the euro area.1 While the
APP has successfully lowered long-term euro area yields so far, the key question for
policymakers and researchers in this regard is how the transmission mechanism of the
APP works. The literature emphasizes the role of two key transmission channels which
broadly ease financial conditions.
The first channel is known as the portfolio balance channel, through which the APP
reduces term premiums of long-term sovereign yields in order to push investors towards
riskier assets, thereby reducing a wide range of interest rates and yields and ultimately
leading to lower financing costs on capital markets. At the same time, the compression of
yields to a bank’s securities leads to an increase in the supply of bank loans, resulting in
lower borrowing costs for households and companies. While some publications, such as
Thornton et al. (2014), find no support for the portfolio balance channel, a large body of
literature, mostly event studies of the impact of QE announcements on bond yields and
interest rates, support the view that there is a strong portfolio balance channel. Promi-
nent examples include Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), and Andrade et al. (2016)
for the US, the UK, and the euro area. Therefore, the standard view shared to date by
policy makers and many researchers is that QE works primarily through the portfolio
balance channel.
The second channel is the signal channel, which is a form of forward guidance used
by central banks to influence market participants’ expectations about future short-term
interest rates. As stressed by Bernanke et al. (2004), one explanation is that announce-
ments of asset purchases directly signal market participants that short-term interest rates
will be kept at the effective lower bound for a longer period of time. Another explanation
is that announcements of asset purchases signal a more pessimistic economic outlook by
the central bank. In any case, announcements of asset purchases eventually lead to expec-
tations of lower interest rates. Consequently, the signaling channel directly stimulates ag-
1Since a QE program such as the APP is defined as a broad-based asset purchase program, the impact of
other smaller purchase programs such as CBPP1/CBPP2, SMP, LTRO/TLTRO, and other instruments is
not considered in this paper.
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gregate demand, since investment and consumption decisions depend on the future path
of short-term interest rate expectations. On the other hand, the signaling channel pushes
down all longer-term interest rates via the expectation hypothesis largely through lower
short-term interest rate expectations. In contrast to the portfolio balance channel, the ef-
fectiveness of the signaling channel is uncertain to date (Gambetti and Musso, 2017).2 In
fact, researchers are not only in disagreement on the size and persistence of the signaling
effect, but also on whether the signal channel is actually operative. Empirical evidence
provided by papers such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014) find evidence for a strong signaling channel in the US, whereas Gagnon
et al. (2011) find virtually no support for it. Regarding the UK’s QE program, Christensen
and Rudebusch (2012) report a negligible role of the signaling channel. As for the euro
area, Deutsche Bundesbank (2016) reports a growing importance of the signaling channel
over time, and Andrade et al. (2016) find that the announcement of the introduction of
the APP reduced substantially the survey forecasts of short-term interest rates, whereas
Urbschat and Watzka (2017) and Altavilla et al. (2015) find a negligible signaling effect
measured as the change in Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates at all maturities.
However, in contrast to the previous literature that focusses on the earlier phase of
the APP, which mostly contained dovish statements, it has become necessary to distin-
guish between statements that are perceived as rather hawkish and those that are per-
ceived as more dovish, given that the ECB has been cautiously adding elements associ-
ated with a tighter monetary stance in its APP-related forward guidance to prepare the
markets for the exit from the stimulus in the wake of economic recovery and rising in-
flation in the euro area from the second half of 2016 onwards.3 As suggested by Glick
and Leduc (2012), QE announcements associated with an easier monetary stance tend
to reduce long-term interest rates, while QE announcements associated with a tighter
monetary stance lead to increases in long-term interest rates. Regarding the transmission
mechanism through which QE affects long-term interest rates, these statements are also
likely to have different signaling effects on the expected future path of short-term interest
rates. More specifically, the signaling channel does not necessarily have an expansionary
effect, but may also have an contractionary effect.
2Besides the signaling and portfolio balance channels, there are other transmission channels of QE which
concentrate on specific market segments or objectives. The credit channel describes increasing willing-
ness on the part of banks to provide credit through increasing banking assets and through increasing
the assets of borrowers. The exchange rate channel describes the situation in which QE makes domestic
bonds less attractive for foreign investors. Hence, the demand for domestic currency will fall, which will
lead to a depreciation of the domestic currency, which in turn will stimulate demand from abroad. The
re-anchoring channel is related to the ability of QE to increase inflation expectations via the central bank’s
commitment to fulfill its inflation target. However, as the credit channel and the exchange rate channel
work through decreasing yields triggered by asset purchases, they can be regarded as sub-channels of
the portfolio balance channel. The re-anchoring channel can be classified as being within the signaling
channel category, since it works through a commitment of the central bank. See Gambetti and Musso
(2017).
3For example, Mr Draghi said in the opening statement to a press conference on 08.09.2016: ‘Meanwhile,
the Governing Council tasked the relevant committees to evaluate the options that ensure a smooth
implementation of our purchase programme.’ which is considered to be a cautiously tapering statement.
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The second challenge in estimating the signaling effect is to examine how it affects
the individual countries of the euro area. So far, most papers dealing with the APP em-
ploy changes in OIS rates to quantify the signaling effect in the euro area.4 An implication
of using these rates is that the same level of short-term interest rate expectations is ex-
pected throughout the euro area, which sidelines the role of country-specific fundamen-
tals in shaping market participants’ interest rate expectations. As stressed by Andritzky
(2012), the structure of government debt has been re-nationalised in the euro area since
the financial crisis, resulting in a shift in the ownership of sovereign bonds back towards
domestic holders. At the end of 2016, the sovereign debt share held by domestic hold-
ers in the major economies of the euro area stood at 40% to 70%, according to Eurostat.
As domestic holders in part build their expectations significantly on domestic macroeco-
nomic releases, their country-specific short-term interest rate expectations, embedded in
government bond yields, should be taken into account. A number of event studies, such
as Connolly and Kohler (2004) and Gürkaynak et al. (2005), investigating the driving
forces of short-term interest rate expectations emphasize the role of domestic and foreign
macroeconomic news in explaining changes in short-term interest rate expectations over
time. Consequently, it is appropriate to explore the impact of the signaling channel on
country-specific expected future path of short-term interest rates embedded in the euro
area sovereign bond yields.
The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the signaling effects of APP statements
on the expected future path of short-term interest rates. First, a novel aspect of this paper
is that the dovish or hawkish tone expressed in APP statements is taken into account in
order to allow a quantitative assessment of the APP’s signaling effect by using reactions
of euro area stock indices on identified event dates. Second, an ELB-consistent shadow-
rate arbitrage-free dynamic term-structure model is employed to extract country-specific
future short-term interest rate expectations embedded in the euro area sovereign zero-
coupon bond yields. Finally, an event-study regression analysis is implemented in order
to assess the impact of dovish and hawkish APP statement surprise on the estimated
country-specific short-term interest rate expectations.
In a nut shell, while the empirical results generally support an operating signaling
channel in the euro area, the estimated effectiveness of the channel is associated with
a considerable degree of uncertainty. First, the results shows that the APP’s signaling
channel have effectively affected the future path of short-term interest rate expectations
throughout the euro area, which is in direct contradiction with the results of Urbschat
and Watzka (2017) and Altavilla et al. (2015). Second, the main result contributing to
the literature is that the signaling effect may have different quantitative impacts on the
future path of interest rate expectations in core and peripheral countries. The expansion-
4OIS are highly liquid instruments that enable financial institutions to exchange the overnight rate for a
fixed interest rate for a wide range of maturities without having to change the terms of the corresponding
loans. As such, OIS rates reflect the market-based expectations of the future path of short-term interest
rates for given maturities. See European Central Bank (2014).
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ary side of the signaling effect appears to be stronger in peripheral countries, while the
contractionary side is more pronounced in core countries. One possible explanation for
this difference in signaling effects might be the economic fragmentation between the core
and the periphery, which would influence the the perceptions by market participants
of the ECB’s economic outlook for the euro area, embedded in the APP statements. A
dovish APP statement surprise implies that the outlook is worse than expected by the
markets, while a hawkish APP statement surprise indicates a better than expected out-
look. Therefore, market participants in stressed peripheral countries are more likely to be
more concerned about a dovish statement surprise, and may find a hawkish statement
surprise less credible. This finding is consistent with De Santis (2016), which states that
the periphery countries benefited more than core countries from APP statements. Third,
by decomposing the future path of interest rate expectations, the results show that short-
term interest rate expectations in the short- and medium-term up to three years ahead
reacted the most to the APP statements. However, a possible omitted variable bias and
the partly implausible responses of interest rate expectations in Portugal and Ireland sug-
gest that these empirical results should be interpreted with caution. Lastly, the sensitivity
of the empirical results to the identification strategy of the APP statements will be exam-
ined. The responses of interest rate expectations to APP statement surprises is found to
vary considerably, depending on the choice of the measure of the degree of the surprise,
as well as of the event days, ultimately revealing that conclusions based on the empirical
results are likely to be fragile.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the identification
scheme. Section 3 describes the process of extracting the interest rate expectations, and
presents the empirical results. Section 4 tests the robustness of the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Identification of APP Statement Surprise
2.1 Identifying Event Days
Identifying the impact of QE is a challenging task. As stressed by Swanson (2017),
since financial markets are forward looking, only the surprise component of an an-
nouncement should affect market prices. Consequently, the lack of an announcement
could also surprise markets if a statement was widely expected. Acknowledging this,
Swanson (2017) uses a rotated factor model to identify QE and forward guidance shocks
in the US. In contrast, most of the literature relies on the narrative approach, which quan-
tifies the impact of QE as changes in certain asset prices observed over a time window
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around identified QE-related events.5 Following this approach, the identification of APP
statement surprise consists of two steps. First, APP-related event dates are to be identi-
fied. In this regard, prominent works such as Gagnon et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) only consider official press statements for event identifica-
tion. While this approach may be appropriate for identifying US and UK QE announce-
ments, owing to their relatively unanticipated nature at their own times, the identification
of APP-related event dates is more challenging against the background that the start of
APP, in early 2015, had already been communicated to the market in 2014. Therefore,
this approach tends to underestimate the number of APP surprises since only consider-
ing the ECB’s official releases would neglect the presence of market anticipations. If an
official statement is widely anticipated by market participants, then it would be already
priced in, and asset prices would not react significantly. Other works, such as Altavilla
et al. (2015) and De Santis (2016), apply a news search-engine based approach to iden-
tify events. That is, they use news search engines such as Factiva and Bloomberg to
estimate a news variable, defined as the sum of all news based on a set of APP-related
keywords. This approach may be better at capturing market expectations and therefore
anticipation effects, but it also tends to overidentify APP-related events. As Urbschat
and Watzka (2017) point out, a potential concern with this approach is that the number
of news events is highly correlated with any Governing Council meeting, leading to a
potential overidentification of events.
To avoid, as much as possible, underestimating or overestimating APP-related
events, the identification scheme in this paper is as follows. As for the start of the event
timeline, the beginning of the APP statements dates back to 2014 since throughout 2014
Mr Draghi made a series of statements in which the start of QE conditional upon the fu-
ture path of inflation expectations was hinted at. Overall, the timeline includes all APP-
related Governing Council decisions as well as press conferences and releases available
in the media section of the ECB’s website, and statements made by Mr Draghi including
hints of APP-related information extracted from the news search engine Factiva. To re-
duce the flood of news, the news filters were set as follows: Company was set to ‘ECB’,
the industry was set to ‘central banking’, and the source was set to ‘Reuters’. Due to its
length, the APP-related event timeline is found in the Appendix. The advantage of this
identification scheme is that only relevant event days are likely to be considered, as it is
known that official press statements and statements made by Mr Draghi are reported by
themajor news agencies, such as Reuters, and closelymonitored by the financial markets,
whereas statements made by other Governing Council members are not accounted for in
the timeline since they are unlikely to be monitored closely by the financial markets.
Nonetheless, some potential issues arising from this identification scheme should
5So far there is no canonical surprise measure of QE policy. Aside from studies using asset prices for
capturing policy surprises, some studies, such as Altavilla and Giannone (2017), use survey data, while
other studies, such as Rosa (2012), rely upon newspaper articles to judge whether QE policy measures
were more expansionary or restrictive than expected. However, these measures can be severely affected
by judgement bias.
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be emphasized. First, as noted by Altavilla et al. (2015), the main problem with such a
scheme is that no APP-related events beyond the ECB’s communications can be identi-
fied, since market participants may adapt their market expectations about the likelihood
of an APP measure according to the economic releases. Hence, the overall impact of APP
on interest rate expectations could be downward-biased. However, the incorporation
of relevant economic releases, such as inflation and growth outlooks, could pollute the
timeline with other news, eventually resulting in an upward bias. The second critical
point when identifying event dates is the potential bias of the author, which could lead
to under- or overestimation of the overall impact of the APP communication on interest
rate expectations. As a robustness check, an index of news coverage of the APP in the
euro area using related keywords, based on the approach of De Santis (2016), from Fac-
tiva could be constructed, and then it could be compared with the APP timeline. The
identification of the APP-related event dates would be robust if these dates were in line
with the spikes of the news index. However, as each point of this daily news index has
to be estimated by hand, such a comparison is left to future research. Finally, it should
always be kept in mind that statements arising from APP-related events also include for-
ward guidance elements and in some cases interest rate announcements. Therefore, the
impact of the APP statements on interest rate expectations could be overestimated.
2.2 Capturing Monetary Policy Surprises
Having constructed the APP timeline, the second step is to measure the policy sur-
prise on the day of an APP-related event. Most studies use asset price reactions for cap-
turing policy surprises. A crucial issue is which asset prices are appropriate for measur-
ing QE policy surprises. In the related literature, common candidates used in the euro
area for measuring such shocks are Euro Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) and Euribor fu-
tures, since these instruments reflect short-term interest rate expectations over certain
horizons. While using futures and swaps for capturing future short-term interest rate
expectations is appropriate for a sovereign state, such as the US or the UK, the shortcom-
ing in using OIS and Euribor futures is that they assume that the short-term interest rate
expectations are the same throughout the euro area, and neglect the possibility that spe-
cific countries may have different future interest rate expectations, depending on their
economic releases. To capture country-specific surprise reactions, the reaction of euro
area stock indices to APP statements is employed as a measure of the APP statement
surprise. The relation between monetary policy and stock market performance has been
widely studied in the literature using different methods, ranging from vector autoregres-
sive models, to event studies, to identification through heteroskedasticity (see, e.g. Cook
and Hahn 1989; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005; Rigobon and Sack 2004; Galí and Gambetti
2015). Works such as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) using an event study find that a 25
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Figure 1:APP statement surprises proxied by the daily returns of EuroStoxx 50
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basis point surprise increase or cut in the policy rate leads to about a 1 percent decline
or increase in stock market returns. Works using identification through heteroskedastic-
ity such as Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Bohl et al. (2008) find an impact about twice
as strong. In contrast to the results based on non-VAR studies, the results from a VAR
impulse response analysis of Galí and Gambetti (2015) find evidence that (mostly since
1980) there are long periods of time in which stock prices react positively to a surprise
tightening. Based on a general equilibrium model, Galí (2014) finds that increases in in-
terest rates lead to an increase in the bubble component of stock prices. Consequently,
stock prices with a high share of bubble component can react positively to surprise in-
creases in the policy rate. However, the majority of the literature notes that a surprising
tightening (respectively, loosening) of monetary policy will lead to a decline (respectively,
increase) in stock market returns.
The stock index data has been collected from Reuters Datastream, and contains
benchmark indices for the following countries: (i) pan-European EuroStoxx 50, (ii) Ger-
man DAX, (iii) French CAC, (iv) Italian FTSE, (v) Spanish IBEX, (vi) Portuguese PSI, (vii)
and Irish ISEQ. Under the assumption of efficient markets, expected policy statements
are already priced in and only the surprise component in a statement will affect stock
prices.6 Against this background, an APP statement surprise is defined as the daily (i)
EuroStoxx (ii) and national stock index return measured in percentage points on the day
of an APP statement. Figure 1 shows the time series of APP statement surprise proxied by
the daily return of EuroStoxx 50 using a one-day window size. The most significant APP
statements are enlisted. First hints to APP started already in early 2014. On 25 March
2014 the EuroStoxx nearly increased by 1.5%, as Draghi said risks of weakening inflation
6There are three variants of the hypothesis. The weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states
that stock prices already reflect all past publicly available information. The semi-strong form of the EMH
additionally assumes a fast pass-through of news information to stock prices. The strong form of the
EMH ultimately assumes that stock prices reflect even insider information. There is a vast finance litera-
ture dealing with the validity of the EMH. Empirical evidence has been mixed, but generally supporting
the weak and semi-weak forms of the EMH in developed economies.
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would warrant a broad-based asset purchases. Five months later, in a speech in Jackson
Hole on 22 August 2014 Draghi stated that Governing Council would acknowledge the
steady decline in medium-term inflation expectations in the euro area and is ready to
launch additional measures. At the same day, the EuroStoxx increased by about 2%. On
22 January 2015 the Governing Council officially announced the APP under which e 60
billion per month of euro area sovereign bonds and other institutional bonds would be
bought. Due to the lack of surprise moment on that day, the index just increased by about
1.5%. On 3 December 2015 the ECB extended the program until at least March 2017 and
failed to meet market expectations of an increase in its monthly purchase volume, which
led to a sharp decrease of the EuroStoxx by more than 3%. On 10 March 2016 the ECB an-
nounced an increase in its monthly bond purchases toe 80 billion. In addition, the APP is
enhanced by the so-called Corporate Sector Purchase program (CSPP) under which the
ECB started to purchase investment-grade cooperate bonds from June 2016. However,
regarding that the statement was already expected months ago and Draghi stated that it
will not be necessary to further reduce policy rates, the statement seemed to disappointed
markets again, as the EuroStoxx decreased by about 2%. On 8 December 2016, as ECB
announced tapering APP’s monthly purchase volume to e 60 billion per month as well
as an extension of APP for another year. The extension of APP seemed to have surprised
the markets despite of the reduction in the purchase volume, as the EuroStoxx increased
by about 1.5%. The APP statement surprises proxied by the daily return of other stock
indices are not shown, as they are highly correlated to that proxied by the daily return of
EuroStoxx.
To capture the dovish and hawkish side of the APP statement surprises, I follow the
approach of Glick and Leduc (2012) and let the stock market reaction speak for itself by
dividing the APP statement surprises by their sign. Dovish APP statement surprises are
defined as positive movements in the surprise time series, since a more dovish than ex-
pected statement would lead to a positive reaction of stock markets. In contrast, hawkish
APP statement surprise are defined as negative movements in the surprise time series,
since a more hawkish than expected statement would decrease stock prices.
2.3 Response of OIS rates to APP statements
To get a first idea of how the expectations for the future path of short-term interest
rates react to the APP’s signaling channel, the reaction of OIS rates on dovish and hawk-
ish APP statement days drawn from Reuters Datastream is analyzed in Figure 2. Since
OIS are bets on the average value of the overnight rate over a certain horizon (Bauer and
Rudebusch, 2014) and the corresponding market is highly liquid for a broad range of
maturities, OIS rates are widely used as estimates of average expectations for the path
of future short-term interest rates over certain horizons. As for any financial claim, OIS
8
Figure 2:Changes in OIS rates based on EONIAwithmaturities up to ten years cumulated
over all APP statement daysmeasured in basis points. The left shows cumulative changes
on dovish statement days and the right on hawkish statement days.
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rates contain term premiums and are not perfect measures for future short-term interest
expectations. Nonetheless, the reaction of OIS rates on these event days allows one to get
an impression to what extent changes in interest rate expectations are affected by the sig-
naling channel in the euro area. For example, if the APP’s signal channel is responsible
for lowering interest rate expectations in the euro area, then a stronger reaction of OIS
rates to short and intermediate maturities should be observable on these days.
On dovish APP statement days, it is striking that short and intermediate-term OIS
rates reacted the most to the statements, while the response of longer-term OIS rates
ranges from weaker to more neutral. This seems to confirm the general expectation that
the signaling channel will more effectively reduce interest rate expectations in the short-
and intermediate-term, which is plausible insofar as a central bank can only provide cred-
ible forward guidance over these horizons in its QE statements.
On hawkish APP statement days, it is observable that the response of the OIS rates
stagnates with increasing maturity, which can be explained in two different ways. A
straight-forward explanation is that the APP has a stronger signaling effect in increas-
ing intermediate- and longer-term interest rate expectations. On the other hand, a more
likely explanation is that the stronger response of longer-term OIS rates merely reflects
increases in term premiums due to the limited effective range of the signaling channel.
Consequently, this could mean that the signaling effect is also effective in increasing in-
terest rate expectations over the intermediate-term.
Overall, these observations about the OIS rates suggest that the signaling channel
plays an important role in guiding interest rate expectations in the euro area over the
intermediate-term. To go beyond this model-free evidence, an ELB-consistent empirical
dynamic term structure model will be used in the next section, allowsing the extraction
of country-specific market-based future short-term interest rate expectations from euro
area sovereign zero-coupon bond yields.
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3 Model and Empirical Results
To date, two classes of model are most used to make inferences about the evolution
of the yield curve: the Nelson–Siegel (NS) and arbitrage-free (AF) models. The first one
is the workhorse model in yield curve modeling, and was developed by Diebold and
Li (2006). NS models are very popular for the following reasons. First, they provide
a parsimonious yet satisfying approximation of the yield curve. Second, the parame-
ters have a clear interpretation as the short, medium and long-run driving forces behind
the evolution of the yield curve. More recently, Diebold and Li (2006) have proposed a
dynamic NS model (DNS), which has become extremely popular among academics, in-
stitutional investors, and central banks due to its remarkably favorable in-sample fit and
out-of-sample performance. However, NS and DNS models neglect the crucial theoreti-
cal assumption of the absence of arbitrage opportunities regarding the immense depth in
the bond trading market (Filipovic´, 1999).
Beginning with Vasicek (1977) and Cox et al. (1985), the class of AF models has been
introduced. It is based on the theoretical restriction of the absence of risk-free arbitrage.
The affine versions of these models are particularly popular, owing to the linear structure
of the yields (Duffie and Kan, 1996). Despite their rigorous theoretical foundation, the
major drawback of affine AF models is a problematic forecasting performance (Duffee,
2002). Consequently, NS and AF models tend to be either empirically successful but the-
oretically lacking, or theoretically rigorous but empirically lacking.
To overcome this drawback, Christensen et al. (2011) have developed a new class
of affine AF models based on the structure of the DNS models. The result is called the
arbitrage free Nelson–Siegel (AFNS) model. It inherits the empirically good fit of DNS
models, while imposing the desirable assumption of the absence of riskless arbitrage. Re-
cent work using AFNS models has studied the transmission of the QE to the yield curve
in the US and the UK (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012), or has specified long-term
inflation expectations using the yield curve dynamics of both nominal and real bonds
(Christensen et al., 2010). However, standard AFNS models ignore the existence of a
lower bound on nominal interest rates because they allow positive probabilities of yields’
moving below the lower bound. Consequently, these AFNS models cannot adequately
describe the dynamics of interest rates at the lower bound and, more importantly, lead to
biased measures of market expectations for the future path of interest rates when current
interest rates become near-zero or negative.
To deal with this issue in a lower bound environment, Christensen and Rudebusch
(2014) augment the AFNS model with the shadow short-rate framework introduced by
Black (1995) and popularized by Krippner (2012). The outcome is called the shadow-rate
AFNSmodel, and imposes a lower bound on nominal interest rates. Recent examples us-
ing shadow-rate AFNS models study the transmission of QE to yields at the zero lower
bound (ZLB) in the US (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2016) or specify inflation expecta-
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tions using the yield curve dynamics of both nominal and real UK bonds (Carriero et al.,
2016). The location of the lower bound is usually considered as being constant and zero
or slightly above zero. For the yield data of US and UK bonds, this is an appropriate as-
sumption since the overnight federal funds rate and the Bank Rate have been kept above
zero for a prolonged period of time since the financial crisis. Prominent examples incor-
porating ZLB are Christensen and Rudebusch (2014), Krippner (2013), Wu (2014), and
Wu and Xia (2016). For the euro area, however, it may be not appropriate to assume a
constant zero lower bound. The reason is that the short-term interest rates tend to anchor
to the ECB’s deposit facility rate, which has been set below zero since June 2014. In con-
trast to the US and UK key overnight rates, the deposit facility rate is also not constant,
since it has often been changed since the financial crisis. And it is hard to say what could
be the lower bound for the deposit facility rate, since the ECB has not set a lower bound
for it (Kortela, 2016). Consequently, these aspects point to a time-varying lower bound
specification for interest rates in the euro area, as also suggested by Kortela (2016), Lemke
and Vladu (2017), and Wu and Xia (2017).
Against this background, the shadow-rate AFNS model has been chosen for the es-
timation of the dynamics of euro area sovereign bond yields, augmented with an esti-
mation process of a time-varying effective lower bound defined as the lower bound per-
ceived by market participants, which can be different from the deposit facility rate. The
daily nominal sovereign zero-coupon yields of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
and Ireland are drawn from Reuters DataStream. The time series data start on 2 January
2007 and end on 17 July 2017 and contain six maturities: one, two, three, five, seven, and
ten years.7 A comparison of the deposit facility rate with euro area one-year bond yields,
shown in Figure 3, indicates that there are three periods of time when the ELB was bind-
ing. First, the yields are positive and bounded by zero or the deposit rate. Second, the
yields become negative, but are still bounded by the deposit rate. Third, the yields fall
below the deposit rate, as is only the case for German, French, and Irish yields. These
three periods are highlighted in red in Figure 3.
For Germany, the first period lasts until 15 August 2014, the second until 9 February
2015, and the third until 17 July 2017, which is the end of the sample period. For France,
the corresponding dates are 29 August 2014, 18 September 2015, and 17 July 2017. For
Italy, the first period lasts until 22 December 2015, and the second until 17 July 2017. For
Spain, the corresponding dates are 28 December 2015 and 17 July 2017. For Portugal, the
corresponding dates are 20 December 2016 and 17 July 2017. And for Ireland, the first
period lasts until 11 February 2015, the second until 14 September 2016, and the third pe-
riod until 17 July 2017. The effective lower bound is treated as the sum of the deposit rate
and a free estimated parameter for each period, essentially allowing the effective lower
7Unlike most term structure papers dealing with QE, three- and six-month sovereign zero-coupon bond
yields are not considered in this paper, as these time series are only available from 2010 onwards. A
shorter sample period underestimates the persistence of bond yields, ultimately leading to a biased esti-
mate of short-term interest rate expectations.
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Figure 3: European one-year sovereign zero-coupon bond yields and the deposit rate
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bound to float around the deposit rate.
3.1 Shadow-rate AFNS framework
The shadow-rate AFNS has three latent state variables, Xt = (Lt; St; Ct), which are
described by the following system of stochastic differential equations under the risk-
neutral Q-measure:0BBB@
dLt
dSt
dCt
1CCCA =
0BBB@
0 0 0
0   
0 0 
1CCCA
26664
0BBB@
Q1
Q2
Q3
1CCCA 
0BBB@
Lt
St
Ct
1CCCA
37775 dt+
0BBB@
dW 1;Qt
dW 2;Qt
dW 3;Qt
1CCCA ; (1)
where the level Lt is an unit-root process under the Q-measure, which is justified by the
fact that the level under the real-world P-measure is very close to being a non-stationary
process. The slope St and curvature Ct are stationary processes, with  as the mean-
reversion rate of both state variables, characterizing the extent to which a deviation of
the curvature from its mean influences the mean of the slope. Q denote the means of the
state variables under the Q-measure. WQt is a three-dimensional Wiener process with a
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lower-triangular diffusion matrix  under the Q-measure.
The shadow short-rate (shadow-rate) is defined as the sum of the level Lt and slope
St, while the short-rate is the maximum of the shadow-rate st and a time-varying ELB
rmint :
st = Lt + St; rt = maxfst; rmint g: (2)
The time-varying ELB rmint is given by
rmint =
8>>><>>>:
dt + 1; the yield is bounded by zero or the deposit rate
dt + 2; the yield becomes negative but is above the deposit rate
dt + 3; the yield is below zero and the deposit rate,
where dt is the deposit facility rate at time t and  is a free parameter for each of the
aforementioned periods.
Christensen and Rudebusch (2016) show that (1) and (2) imply that the yield on the
shadow discount bond yt() at time t with residual maturity  is an exponentially affine
function of the latent state variables, given by
yt() = Lt + (
1  e 

)St + (
1  e 

  e  )Ct   A()

;
where A() is the so-called yield-adjustment term, which only depends on the maturity,
and captures the convexity effects which characterize the relation between the bond price
and the corresponding yield. Its explicit form is to be found in Christensen et al. (2011).
The corresponding instantaneous shadow forward rate is given by
ft() =   @
@T
lnP (t; T ) =
@
@
yt() = Lt + e
 St + e Ct +Af ();
where the yield-adjustment term in the instantaneous forward rate is given by Af () =
 A()= . Christensen and Rudebusch (2014) provide a formula for the instantaneous
forward rate that respects the ELB rmint :
f
t
() = rmint + (ft()  rmint )

ft()  rmint
!()

+ !()
1p
2
exp

  1
2

ft()  rmint
!()
2
;
where () is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and !() is a function related to the conditional variance v(;  + ) of an European
call option with a residual maturity of  , contingent on the zero-coupon bond residual
maturity  + .
!()2 =
1
2
lim
!0
@2v(;  + )
@2
=  1
2
211  
1
2
222
1  e 2
2
  1
2
233

1  e 2
4
  1
2
e 2   1
2
2e 2

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The zero-coupon bond yield that respects the ELB is consequently given by
y
t
() =
1

Z t+
t
f
t
(s)ds
=
1

Z t+
t

rmint + (ft()  rmint )

ft()  rmint
!()

  !() 1p
2
exp

  1
2

ft()  rmint
!()
2
ds
(3)
Under the real-world P-measure, the maximally flexible specification of the shadow-
rate AFNS model is0BBB@
dLt
dSt
dCt
1CCCA =
0BBB@
11 12 13
21 22 23
31 32 33
1CCCA
26664
0BBB@
P1
P2
P3
1CCCA 
0BBB@
Lt
St
Ct
1CCCA
37775 dt+
0BBB@
11 0 0
21 22 0
31 32 33
1CCCA
0BBB@
dW 1;Pt
dW 2;Pt
dW 3;Pt
1CCCA :
As discussed in Bauer and Rudebusch (2014), term structure models suffer from
small-sample estimation bias. Since interest rates are highly persistent, model estimates
from the above specifications will underestimate the degree of interest rate persistence.
As a consequence, the future short-term interest rates will revert to their mean faster than
expected, resulting in overly stable expectation estimates. As a consequence, the decom-
position process of the yields would be severely corrupted. To reduce the small-sample
estimation bias, an unit-root property is imposed on the level factor Lt, which results in
a zero restriction of 11 and 1.
As a Gaussian term structuremodel, the conditional mean vector and the conditional
covariance matrix are generally given by
EPt [Xt+t ] = (I   e K
pt)P + e K
ptXt
V Pt [Xt+t ] =
Z t
0
e K
P s0e (K
P )0sds:
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters is based on the extended
Kalman filter. To guarantee finding the global maximum, the likelihood with respect
to the parameters is maximized using the particle swarm optimization algorithm with
200 particles, followed by the Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm.8 Translating these
continuous-time conditional moments into conditional moments of discrete observations
in order to estimate the model parameters, the transition equation describing the dynam-
ics of the state variables under the P-measure is written as
Xt = (I   e Kpt)P + e KptXt 1 + t;
8Among the global optimization algorithms, the particle swarm optimization algorithm has been found to
deliver higher likelihoods than other algorithms, such as simulated annealing, genetic algorithms, and
pattern search. The Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm is then used to ensure convergence. For technical
details, see Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and Nelder and Mead (1965).
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where t is the time between observations and t is the transition error. The measure-
ment equation which describes the dynamics of the zero-coupon bond yields found in
Equation (3) is generally non-linear. For the estimation, it has to be linearized by a first-
order Taylor approximation:
y
t
= z(Xt; ) + "t
 z(Xtjt 1; ) +
@z(Xt; )
@Xt

Xt=Xtjt 1
(Xt  Xtjt 1)
= At( ) +Bt( )Xt + "t;
where Xtjt 1 is the predicted estimate of Xt at t   1 in the extended Kalman filter,  
contains the model parameters, and "t is the measurement error. At( ) and Bt( ) can be
written as
At( ) = z(Xtjt 1; ) 
@z(Xt; )
@Xt

Xt=Xtjt 1
Xtjt 1
Bt( ) =
@z(Xt; )
@Xt

Xt=Xtjt 1
:
Lastly, the error structure follows a normal distribution:0@t
"t
1A  N
240@0
0
1A ;
0@Q 0
0 H
1A35 ;
where the transition and measurement errors are assumed to be orthogonal to the initial
state. The conditional covariance matrix for the transition errors is
Q =
Z t
0
e K
P s0e (K
P )0sds;
and the conditional covariance matrix for measurement errors is the diagonal matrix
H = diag(2"(1); : : : ; 
2
"(N )):
3.2 Empirical results
The parameter estimates for euro area sovereign bond yields are shown in Table 1.
Regarding the interpretation of the parameters, the estimates with respect to German
bond yields can be translated into the daily conditional mean-reversion matrix and con-
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Table 1: Parameter estimates for euro area sovereign zero-coupon bond yields
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
12 -0.284 -0.576 -0.277 -0.161*** -0.069*** -0.523***
(0.252) (0.219) (0.425) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001)
13 -0.314** -0.333*** -0.500*** -0.375*** -0.349*** -0.357***
(0.148) (0.105) (0.144) (0.053) (0.001) (0.001)
21 0.770*** 0.239 0.610 0.647*** 2.454*** 4.558***
(0.278) (0.195) (0.625) (0.066) (0.001) (0.001)
22 1.228*** 0.512* 1.221** 1.280*** 2.257*** 3.669***
(0.364) (0.287) (0.530) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001)
23 0.180 0.264* 0.258 0.277*** -0.617*** -1.118***
(0.188) (0.156) (0.284) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001)
31 -2.209** -0.260 0.177 0.768*** -5.129*** -5.951***
(0.976) (0.249) (0.240) (0.098) (0.001) (0.001)
32 -2.416*** -0.994 -0.602 -0.447*** -4.509*** -2.464***
(0.887) (0.798) (0.520) (0.066) (0.001) (0.001)
33 1.725*** 1.537*** 2.159*** 1.206 2.344*** 3.050***
(0.423) (0.417) (0.430) (0.058) (0.165) (0.001)
11 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.084*** 0.062***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
21 -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
22 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.122*** 0.103***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
31 -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.123*** -0.067*** -0.2733 -0.222***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.024) (0.006) (0.001)
32 -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.007*** -0.206*** -0.135***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.001)
33 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.079*** 0.060*** 0.199*** 0.139***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001)
2 0.006 -0.018 -0.014 -0.010 -0.023 0.009***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.001)
3 -0.073*** -0.063*** -0.051** -0.063 0.032 0.002***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.032) (0.067) (0.001)
 0.434*** 0.419*** 0.457*** 0.404*** 0.612*** 0.630***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002)
1 -0.003*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2 -0.004*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LogL 111,265.93 112,047.88 104,634.32 105,092.09 91,035.82 95,629.86
Estimated parameters of the shadow-rate AFNS model. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance of t-statistics at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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ditional covariance matrix:
e K
P 1
260 =
0BBB@
1:000  0:001 0:001
 0:003 0:995  0:001
 0:009 0:002 0:993
1CCCA ;
Z 1
260
0
e K
P s0e (K
P )0sds =
0BBB@
1:6 10 6  1:6 10 6  2:5 10 6
 1:6 10 6 2:4 10 6 1:0 10 6
 2:5 10 6 1:0 10 6 1:5 10 5
1CCCA :
As usual, the mean-reversion matrix suggests that the factors are highly persistent on
a daily basis and that there is virtually no interaction between them. The conditional
covariance matrix suggests that the level factor shock is the least volatile and the cur-
vature factor shock is the most volatile. In terms of covariance, the correlation between
the shocks to the level and to the slope, as well as to the level and curvature, is nega-
tive, while that between the shocks to the slope and curvature is positive. As for the
estimated parameters for the other zero-coupon yields, the results are very similar and
therefore they are available upon request. In the next step, the estimated parameters will
be used to calculate short-term interest rate expectations. The conditional expectation of
the shadow-rate is
EPt [st+ ] = E
P
t [Lt+ + St+ ] = (1 1 0)E
P
t [Xt+ ]
= (1 1 0)

(I   e Kp )P + e KpXt 1

:
The conditional covariance matrix of the state variables is
V Pt [Xt+ ] =
Z 
0
e K
P s0e (K
P )0sds:
Therefore, the conditional covariance of the shadow-rate is
V Pt [st+ ] = (1 1 0)V
P
t [Xt+ ](1 1 0)
0:
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Following Kim and Singleton (2012), the short-term interest rate expectations  years
ahead is described by
EPt [rt+ ] =
Z 1
 1
rt+(rt+ jXt)drt+
= rmint +
Z 1
rmint
(st+   rmint )(st+ jXt)dst+
= rmint + (E
P
t [st+ ]  rmint )

EPt [st+ ]  rmint
V Pt [st+ ]

+
q
V Pt [st+ ]
1p
2
exp

  1
2

EPt [st+ ]  rmint
V Pt [st+ ]
2
;
and the average level of expected future short-term interest rates over the residual matu-
rity  of the bond is then
1

Z t+
t
EPt [ru]du:
Figure 4 shows the estimated time series of the country-specific average level of
short-term interest rate expectations over the next five years. The movements show that
interest rate expectations in the euro area started to decline increasingly from 2014 on-
wards. As expectations for an European QE program increased significantly during this
period, the APP’s signal channel seems to have played a significant role in the decline in
interest rate expectations. But other domestic and foreign factors, such asworse economic
and inflation outlooks or international spillovers, might also have contributed to the de-
cline in interest rate expectations. According to Deutsche Bundesbank (2016), changes in
interest rate expectations can also reflect different economic outlooks for the euro area,
making an isolation of the contribution of the APP program difficult without considering
the relevant event days. Hence, the next step is to quantify the impact of dovish and
hawkish APP statement surprises on the short-term interest rate expectations.
There are several well-known approaches to assess the impact of a monetary policy
surprise on financial variables. While some studies, such as Wright (2012) and Rogers
et al. (2014), rely on a VAR-based impulse-response analysis, the most popular approach
is the event-study approach, which was initiated by, e.g. Cook and Hahn (1989), Kut-
tner (2001), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), and is based on the fact that monetary
policy actions and statements can trigger surprise jumps in asset prices within a narrow
window. In other words, this approach basically assumes that a surprise reflected by
changes in asset prices can be captured within a window of some predetermined size
around the given event. Consequently, the choice of an appropriate size for the window
is crucial for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the response. While too narrow a win-
dow may miss parts of the surprise, too wide a window may pollute the surprise with
other news.9 To address this issue, several papers, such as Rigobon and Sack (2004), Bohl
9Given the fast pass-through of changes in financial markets, using a one- or two-day window around an
announcement has become common in the literature on high frequency identification of monetary policy.
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Figure 4: The country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations over the next five
years extracted from euro area sovereign bond yields
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Sources: Reuters Datastream; author’s calculations
et al. (2008), and Rogers et al. (2014), apply the identification through heteroskedasticity
approach proposed by Rigobon (2003). In order to estimate the passthrough of monetary
policy shocks, this approach employs the assumption that the variance of monetary pol-
icy shocks is higher on days of policy announcements. Additionally, the ITH approach is
also robust to endogeneity and omitted variables bias. All in all, this approach is based
on much weaker assumptions than the event-study approach. However, one assumption
of using this approach here is that the variance of the measure of the surprise, proxied
by stock index returns, should be higher on APP statement days. This is very unlikely,
since stock markets are influenced by many types of news: economic, business, financial,
and political. Monetary policy announcements are only one of these influences. Com-
paring the event-study and the ITH approaches, Rosa (2011) concludes that the event-
study estimates of the response of asset prices to monetary policy shocks indeed contain
a significant bias, but it is quite small. He also concludes that the event-study approach
outperforms the ITH approach in terms of expected squared error.
Against this background, the event-study approach has been implemented. The
event regressions were run in a similar spirit to that in Glick and Leduc (2012). And
to control for unobserved market news, I have followed the approach of Urbschat and
Watzka (2017) and include the EuroStoxx 50 Volatility (VSTOXX) index and five-year US
19
bond yields in the regression. Consequently, the change in the country-specific average
short-term interest rate expectations over the next five years is regressed against dovish
and hawkish APP statement surprises and control variables. The regression equation
takes the form
yt = + 1s
+
t + 2s
 
t + 1vstoxxt + 2y
US
t + "t; (4)
where t indexes the business days from January 3, 2007 to July 17, 2017, yt is the daily
change in the given average interest rate expectations over the next five years, s+t is the
dovish, and s t is the hawkish APP statement surprise. As for the control variables,
vstoxxt is the logarithm of the VSTOXX and yUSt is the daily change in five-year US
zero-coupon bond yields. Lastly, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation often arise in
high-frequency financial time series, which lead to incorrect standard errors of the APP
announcement surprises and control variables. This implies that an inference based on
these standard errors will be invalid. Durbin–Watson and Breusch–Pagan test statistics
confirm these issues in the models.10 Therefore, the heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HAC) standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987) will be used
to to draw correct inferences on the significance of the above explanatory variables.
Table 2 shows the responses of the average short-term interest rate expectations
over the next five years in the euro area to dovish and hawkish APP statement surprises
proxied by the daily change in EuroStoxx 50 in Panel A and by the daily change in the
corresponding European national stock indexes in Panel B, respectively. As expected,
the R2 values in these regressions are low, overall, reflecting the fact that the dovish and
hawkish APP statement surprise variables only account for the variations in interest rate
expectations on APP-related event days in the sample period. Nevertheless, it should
always be kept in mind that a low R2 value indicates an omitted variable bias, which
means that the estimates may be biased. Overall, the sign, the size, and the significance of
the coefficients of the explanatory variables provide insights into changes in the country-
specific average interest rate expectations over the next five years in the euro area on APP
statement days in comparison to changes on non-statement days over the sample period.
Since the estimates of both panels are very similar, the focus will be on the estimates in
Panel B, which show that dovish monetary surprises led to highly significant declines in
the country-specific average interest rate expectations over the next five years in the euro
area, while hawkish monetary surprises raised them with mixed statistical significance.
Regarding dovish APP statements, a one percentage point dovish surprise shock de-
creases the country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations over the next
five years in the euro area by around 0.5 to 0.8 basis points, with interest rate expecta-
tions in the periphery countries reacting more sensitively than those from core countries.
Turning to hawkish APP statements, a one percentage point corresponding surprise
shock increases the country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations over the
10The results are available upon request.
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Table 2: The response  of changes in the country-specific average short-term interest rate expec-
tations over the next five years in the euro area to APP statement surprises proxied by the daily
change in Eurostoxx 50 and national stock indexes measured in percentage points
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
Panel A: EuroStoxx 50
Dovish APP surprise -0.548*** -0.498*** -0.712*** -0.631*** -0.730** -0.699***
(0.179) (0.173) (0.114) (0.149) (0.333) (0.225)
Hawkish APP surprise 0.734 1.056 0.817*** 0.871*** 0.002 1.849**
(0.560) (0.917) (0.303) (0.259) (0.224) (0.899)
Log VSTOXX -0.628*** -0.735*** 0.026 0.064 -0.405 -0.364
(0.158) (0.242) (0.201) (0.215) (0.872) (0.307)
 US 5Y bond yields 0.065*** 0.081*** 0.012 0.003 -0.067 0.011
(0.011) (0.015) (0.01) (0.011) (0.051) (0.016)
Intercept 1.925*** 2.240*** -0.129 -0.250 1.193 1.085
(0.482) (0.744) (0.606) (0.647) (2.627) (0.922)
R2 0.047 0.045 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005
Panel B: National stock indexes
Dovish APP surprise -0.484*** -0.452*** -0.578*** -0.564*** -0.737* -0.756**
(0.177) (0.174) (0.083) (0.183) (0.402) (0.299)
Hawkish APP surprise 0.885 1.141 0.418** 0.684** -0.036 2.463**
(0.550) (0.927) (0.209) (0.276) (0.185) (1.206)
Log VSTOXX -0.626*** -0.733*** 0.023 0.062 -0.404 -0.351
(0.158) (0.242) (0.201) (0.215) (0.873) (0.307)
 US 5Y bond yields 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.012 0.004 -0.067 0.011
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.051) (0.016)
Intercept 1.915*** 2.233*** -0.118 -0.242 1.191 1.042
(0.482) (0.744) (0.606) (0.648) (2.628) (0.923)
R2 0.047 0.045 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004
HAC standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
next five years in the euro area by about 0 to 2.5 basis points, albeit with less certainty than
in the dovish case. It is striking that while interest rate expectations in Portugal barely re-
act to hawkish shocks, the response of interest rate expectations in Ireland is remarkably
strong. Given their similar underlying economic fundamentals, it is difficult to find a
reasonable explanation for such different reactions. A simple explanation would be that
double-digit percentage point growth in these countries’ zero-coupon bond yields during
the sovereign debt crisis led to a substantial underestimation of the persistence of yields
over time, resulting in a biased estimation of short-term interest rate expectations. Apart
from the reaction of interest rate expectations in Portugal and Ireland, the results suggest
that interest rate expectations in the other peripheral countries reacted less strongly than
those of core countries to hawkish surprise shocks.
To quantify the cumulative impact of these APP surprises over the entire sample
period, the total changes of the country-specific average short-term interest rate expecta-
tions over the next five years in the euro area on all dovish and hawkish APP surprises
are shown in Table 3, which are calculated by the corresponding response of rate expecta-
tions to a one percentage point dovish and hawkish APP statement surprise shock found
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Table 3: The total changes in the country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations
over the next five years in the euro area due to APP statement surprises measured in percentage
points
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
Panel A: Eurostoxx 50
Dovish APP surprise -24 -22 -31 -27 -32 -30
Hawkish APP surprise 17 24 19 20 0 43
Panel B: National stock indexes
Dovish APP surprise -20 -19 -33 -25 -30 -26
Hawkish APP surprise 19 27 14 16 -1 43
in Table 2 multiplied by the total sum of dovish and hawkish APP statement surprises
over the sample period, respectively. Also here, the figures involving the surprises prox-
ied by national stock indexes found in Panel B are interpretable. These figures indicate
that dovish APP statement surprises led to a roughly 19 to 33 basis point significant de-
cline in the country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations over the next
five years in the euro area over the sample period, while hawkish surprises increased
them largely insignificantly by -1 to 43 basis points in total. As foreshadowed by the
point estimates in the previous table, these results suggest that (i) the APP’s signaling
channel is more effective in reducing future interest rate expectations in peripheral coun-
tries, and, with less certainty, that (ii) the signaling effect is stronger in increasing future
interest rate expectations in the core countries. However, the response of the German,
French, Portuguese, and Irish interest rate expectations to hawkish surprises is highly
insignificant in the first three cases and implausible in the latter two cases, reminding us
that these point estimates should be interpreted with caution.
One possible explanation for this difference in signaling effect between core and pe-
ripheral countries might be how market participants from the respective countries per-
ceive the ECB’s assessment of the economic outlook in the euro area, as implied by the
APP statements. More specifically, a dovish or hawkish surprise implies a more pes-
simistic or optimistic assessment of the ECB’s future economic outlook than expected by
the market. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that market participants in stressed pe-
ripheral countries are more concerned about dovish surprises because it is likely that the
more pessimistic assessment embedded in a dovish surprise will be more addressed to
their countries. In contrast, market participants in better-situated core countries may
be more likely to respond to hawkish surprises, as they find the more optimistic as-
sessment embedded in a hawkish surprise more plausible for their countries. As a re-
sult, market participants in peripheral countries would perceive a dovish surprise more
strongly, which would eventually lead to a greater decline in their interest rate expecta-
tions, whereas market participants in core countries may find a hawkish surprise more
credible, which in turn leads to stronger increases in their interest rate expectations. In
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other words, interest rate expectations in peripheral countries tend to react more strongly
to dovish APP statement surprises, and thus these countries may benefit more from the
signaling channel. This finding is in line with De Santis (2016), which states that the
periphery countries benefited more from APP statements than core countries.11
Figure 5: The total change of the short-term interest rate expectations up to the next five
years ahead in the euro area due to dovish APP statement surprises
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Sources: Reuters Datastream; author’s calculations
Lastly, to study the response of interest rate expectations in greater detail, the daily
changes in country-specific short-term interest rate expectations up to five years ahead
is regressed against APP statement surprises and control variables in the spirit of (4).
The total change of country-specific short-term interest rate expectations up to five years
ahead on all dovish or hawkish APP statement surprises, which is calculated by the re-
sponse of the corresponding rate expectations to a one percentage point surprise shock
multiplied by the sum of dovish or hawkish surprises, is shown in Figure 5 and Fig-
ure 6, respectively. As expected, short-term interest rate expectations in the short- and
medium-term up to three years ahead reacted the most to the APP statements. Regard-
ing the total change of interest rate expectations up to the next five years ahead on dovish
APP statement surprises, Figure 5 shows a steeper decline of interest rate expectations in
11Like most papers dealing with QE programs, De Santis (2016) makes no distinction between dovish and
hawkish QE statements and implicitly assume a QE statement is always dovish.
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peripheral countries, with peaks around -40 basis points, while the maximal decline of
interest rate expectations in Germany and France is around -30 and -20 basis points, re-
spectively. Turning to the total change of interest rate expectations up to the next five
years ahead on hawkish APP statement surprises, Figure 6 shows that there is a stronger
increase of interest rate expectations in core countries, with peaks around 30 basis points.
Regarding the southern periphery countries, the maximum increase of interest rate ex-
pectations in Italy and Spain is around 20 basis points, while that for Portugal is about
zero. The maximum increase of interest rate expectations in Ireland, however, is around
75 basis points.
Figure 6: The total change of the short-term interest rate expectations up to the next five
years ahead in the euro area due to hawkish APP statement surprises
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In a nut shell, the key finding is that the APP’s signaling channel may play a crucial
role in guiding short-term interest rate expectations over the short- and intermediate-
term in the euro area. With regard to country-specific differences in the size of this effect,
the signaling effect is found to bemore powerful in lowering rate expectations on the part
of peripheral countries and in raising rate expectations for core countries, implying the
periphery countries may benefit more from the signaling channel. However, a possible
omitted variable bias, as indicated by the lowR2 values as well as questionable responses
of interest rate expectations in Portugal and Ireland to hawkish APP statement surprise
24
shocks, suggests that the results may come with a considerable degree of uncertainty.
Therefore, these findings must be taken with greater caution.
4 Robustness
Two robustness checks have been used to assess the validity of the specification in
the previous section. The first robustness check concerns the choice of APP statement sur-
prise measure in Equation (4), by using another market-based surprise measure, whereas
the second also modifies the APP event timeline using a keyword-based surprise mea-
sure. In short, while the robustness checks largely support the presence of signaling
effects, the magnitude of the effects appears to be uncertain.
First, stock indexes are replaced by a so-called signal-factor derived from a factor
analysis incorporating a set of short-, medium-, and long-term financial variable rates.
In the spirit of Chen et al. (2014), a factor analysis is applied to identify two factors from
a set which contains the daily changes of the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year ahead 3-month
Euribor futures rates, and of 5-year, 7-year, and 10-year OIS rates, on APP statement
days. The first factor, known as the signal-factor, is driven by changes in the short- and
intermediate-term rates, and therefore should be correlated with the signaling channel.
The second factor, called the market-factor, is driven by changes in longer-term rates, and
is associated with the portfolio balance channel. These two factors accumulate about 96
percent of the variation of the data set. The common Varimax rotation method is then
applied to maximize the sum of the variance of the squared loadings. The signal-factor
is then used as the measure of the APP statement surprise, since it corresponds to the
surprises of the market regarding information about the future path of interest rates over
the intermediate-term, which should be the maximum period over which central banks
are able to guide the future path of interest rate expectations. Lastly, the signal-factor
is divided into positive and negative reactions, which are then used as measures of the
dovish and hawkish APP statement surprises.
Second, the keyword-basedHawkish–Dovish (HD) index proposed byNardelli et al.
(2017) is used as an alternative instrument to gauge the tone of the APP statements. Us-
ing a sophisticated Support Vector Machines text classification on a data set of around
9000 monetary policy related media articles published since January 1999, Nardelli et al.
(2017) construct an index which measures the degree of dovishness or hawkishness of
the media’s perception of the ECB’s tone at each press conference. To obtain this alterna-
tive APP statement surprise shock measure, the so-called one-day communication shock
is estimated, which is the difference between the index value on the day of the press
conference and that of the previous day. Lastly, the communication shock is divided
into negative and positive reactions, which are then used as the measures for the dovish
and hawkish APP statement surprises. In contrast to my identified APP-related event
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timeline, only the official press conferences from 03 April 2014 to 08 June 2017 are con-
sidered here, excluding any APP-related speeches and interviews made by Mr Draghi.
Hence, the calculated signaling effects based on these surprises are expected to be rather
small.
Table 4: The response  of changes in the country-specific average short-term interest rate expec-
tations over the next five years in the euro area to APP statement surprises proxied by the signal
factor and the one-day communication shock of the HD-Index
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
Panel A: Signal-factor
Dovish APP surprise -1.204*** -1.250*** -1.067*** -1.238*** -1.681** -1.851***
(0.303) (0.282) (0.201) (0.318) (0.674) (0.405)
Hawkish APP surprise 1.127** 2.097*** 0.939*** 0.873*** 0.032 2.847***
(0.497) (0.571) (0.332) (0.307) (0.225) (0.455)
Log VSTOXX -0.636*** -0.740*** 0.020 0.055 -0.417 -0.375
(0.158) (0.243) (0.201) (0.215) (0.873) (0.306)
 US 5Y bond yields 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.012 0.003 -0.067 0.011
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.051) (0.016)
Intercept 1.947*** 2.251*** -0.115 -0.222 1.232 1.116
(0.484) (0.744) (0.605) (0.647) (2.629) (0.921)
R2 0.049 0.050 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.008
Panel B: HD-Index
Dovish APP surprise -9.38* -11.70 -20.91*** -22.82*** -21.49 -29.74**
(5.56) (7.47) (7.10) (8.11) (16.55) (14.18)
Hawkish APP surprise -17.43 -14.61 5.27 -4.28 4.37 12.12
(12.34) (14.86) (5.74) (5.84) (12.16) (13.48)
Log VSTOXX -0.64*** -0.75*** 0.03 0.06 -0.40 -0.36
(0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.22) (0.87) (0.31)
 US 5Y bond yields 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
Intercept 1.97*** 2.29*** -0.15 -0.24 1.15 1.08
(0.49) (0.77) (0.61) (0.65) (2.63) (0.92)
R2 0.044 0.042 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
HAC standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 4 shows the responses of the average country-specific short-term interest rate
expectations over the next five years to dovish and hawkish APP statement surprises, as
proxied by the positive and negative reactions of the signal-factor in Panel A and by the
negative and positive reactions of the communication shock in Panel B.
In Panel A, the estimates suggest that a one point dovish surprise shock significantly
decreases the country-specific average short-term interest rate expectations over the next
five years in the euro area by around 1.1 to 1.9 basis points, and that a one point hawkish
surprise shock increases these expectations by around 0 to 2.8 basis points with mixed
significance. In Panel B, a one point dovish surprise shock decreases the country-specific
average short-term interest rate expectations over the next five years in the euro area by
around 9.4 to 29.7 basis points with mixed significance, and a one point hawkish surprise
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shock insignificantly increases the expectations in Italy, Portugal, and Ireland by around
4.4 to 12.1 basis points, as well as decreases those in Germany, France, and Spain by
around 4.3 to 17.4 basis points.
Table 5: The total change of the country-specific average interest rate expectations using different
APP statement surprise identification approaches
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
Dovish APP statement surprise
EuroStoxx 50 -24 -22 -31 -27 -32 -30
National indexes -20 -19 -33 -25 -30 -26
Signal-factor -23 -24 -20 -24 -32 -35
HD-shock -3 -3 -6 -6 -6 -8
Hawkish APP statement surprise
EuroStoxx 17 24 19 20 0 43
National indexes 19 27 14 16 -1 43
Signal-factor 22 40 18 17 1 54
HD-shock -13 -11 4 -3 3 9
The total changes of the average country-specific interest rate expectations over the
next five years in the euro area on all dovish and hawkish statement surprises proxied
by the EuroStoxx 50, the national stock indexes, the signal-factor, and the HD-index are
shown in Table 5.12
First, sharing the same identified APP-related event dates, the total changes of rate
expectations incorporating the signal-factor are quantitatively similar to the empirical
results from the previous section. However, a closer look reveals that the responses of
rate expectations in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain to dovish signal-factor shocks do
not differ significantly from each other, casting doubt on the finding that the signaling
effect is stronger for peripheral countries in terms of lowering rate expectations. Turn-
ing to hawkish signal-factor shocks, the responses of rate expectations broadly support
the finding that the signaling effect is weaker for the southern periphery countries in
terms of increasing rate expectations, albeit the response of rate expectations in France is
probably overestimated due to the fact that Germany and France have similar economic
fundamentals and therefore should have similar responses of rate expectations.
Second, the total changes of rate expectations incorporating the HD communication
shock are quantitatively much less like the empirical results. The total changes of interest
rate expectations on all dovish HD communication shocks are quite low. This outcome
is not surprising given that the corresponding event timeline only takes into account the
12The total change of interest rate expectations over all dovish statement surprises proxied by the signal-
factor and the HD-index is estimated similary to those proxied by the EuroStoxx 50 and the national
stock indexes in Table 3.
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days when press conferences are held, and thus the signaling effect is most probably un-
derestimated in this case. Nevertheless, this shows that the estimated effectiveness of
the signaling channel depends heavily on the identification of the event days. The total
changes of interest rate expectations on all hawkish HD communication shocks, how-
ever, are inconsistent against the background that these results are neither interpretable
in a proper way nor statistically significant.
In summary, the empirical results cannot withstand these robustness checks, which
show that while APP’s signaling effects are found to be present, the magnitude of these
effects is questionable, and its estimation strongly depends on the choice of event days
as well as on that of the surprise measure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the impact of APP’s signaling channel on country-specific future short-
term rate expectations in the euro area has been examined by using a model-based event
study. First, based on an identified event set, euro area stock indexes have been used to
extract dovish and hawkish APP statement surprise reactions. Second, country-specific
future short-term rate expectations embedded in euro area sovereign zero-coupon bond
yields have been extracted by applying an ELB-consistent shadow-rate AFNS model.
Lastly, an event-study analysis has been employed to assess the impact of APP dovish
and hawkish statement surprises on the estimated short-term interest rate expectations
in the euro area.
To conclude, this event-study analysis has been performed during a period of the
APP characterized by a transition from a prevalence of dovish statements to an increas-
ing number of hawkish statements. The empirical results suggest that the APP’s signaling
channel may play a crucial role in guiding the future path of short-term interest expec-
tations in the euro area. The main result is that the signaling channel has the greatest
impact on short-term interest rate expectations over the next three years, and may act
differently for peripheral countries than for core countries. In terms of lowering rate ex-
pectations through dovish statement surprises, the signaling effect tends to be stronger
for the periphery countries. In terms of increasing rate expectations through hawkish
statement surprises, the signaling effect appears to be stronger for core countries. In
other words, the reaction of interest rate expectations in peripheral countries tends to be
stronger to dovish APP statement surprises, and thus these countries may benefit more
from the signaling channel. One possible explanation for this difference in signaling ef-
fects could be that the perception of market participants for the assessment of the ECB’s
economic outlook implied by the APP statements depends on the development of the
domestic economy. However, these implications carry a considerable degree of uncer-
tainty, owing to a possible omitted variable bias and the partly implausible reactions of
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the interest rate expectations to the surprises in the empirical results. Finally, while gen-
erally confirming the presence of signaling effects, the robustness checks demonstrate the
vulnerability of the implications to their dependence on the APP identification scheme.
Overall, these results shed light on the significance of the APP’s signaling channel in the
euro area. Whether these implications will persist in the later phase of the APP, where
hawkish statements could predominate, remains a matter for future research.
References
Altavilla, C., Carboni, G., and Motto, R. (2015). Asset Purchase Programmes and Finan-
cial Markets: Lessons from the Euro Area. ECB Working Paper No. 1864, European
Central Bank.
Altavilla, C. and Giannone, D. (2017). The Effectiveness of Non-Standard Monetary Pol-
icy Measures: Evidence from Survey Data. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 32(5): 952–
964.
Andrade, P., Breckenfelder, J. H., De Fiore, F., Karadi, P., and Tristani, O. (2016). The
ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme: An Early Assessment. ECB Working Paper No.
1956, European Central Bank.
Andritzky, J. (2012). Government Bonds and their Investors: What Are the Facts and Do
they Matter? IMF Working Paper 12/158, International Monetary Fund.
Bauer, M. D. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2014). The Signaling Channel for Federal Reserve
Bond Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, 10(3): 233–289.
Bernanke, B., Reinhart, V., and Sack, B. (2004). Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero
Bound: An Empirical Assessment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004(2): 1–100.
Bernanke, B. S. and Kuttner, K. N. (2005). What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to
Federal Reserve Policy? The Journal of Finance, 60(3): 1221–1257.
Black, F. (1995). Interest Rates as Options. The Journal of Finance, 50(5): 1371–1376.
Bohl, M. T., Siklos, P. L., and Sondermann, D. (2008). European Stock Markets and the
ECB’s Monetary Policy Surprises. International Finance, 11(2): 117–130.
Carriero, A., Mouabbi, S., and Vangelista, E. (2016). UK Term Structure Decompositions
at the Zero Lower Bound. Working Paper 755, Queen Mary University of London,
School of Economics and Finance.
Chen, J., Mancini Griffoli, T., and Sahay, R. (2014). Spillovers from United States Mone-
tary Policy on Emerging Markets; Different This Time? IMF Working Papers 14/240,
International Monetary Fund.
Christensen, J. H., Diebold, F. X., and Rudebusch, G. D. (2011). The Affine Arbitrage-Free
Class of Nelson–Siegel Term Structure Models. Journal of Econometrics, 164(1): 4–20.
Christensen, J. H., Lopez, J. A., and Rudebusch, G. D. (2010). Inflation Expectations and
Risk Premiums in an Arbitrage-Free Model of Nominal and Real Bond Yields. Journal
29
of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(s1): 143–178.
Christensen, J. H. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2012). The Response of Interest Rates to US and
UK Quantitative Easing. The Economic Journal, 122(564): F385–F414.
Christensen, J. H. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2014). Estimating Shadow-Rate Term Structure
Models with Near-Zero Yields. Journal of Financial Econometrics, 13(2): 226–259.
Christensen, J. H. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2016). Modeling Yields at the Zero Lower
Bound: Are Shadow Rates the Solution? Advances in Econometrics, 35: 75–125.
Cochrane, J. H. and Piazzesi, M. (2002). The Fed and Interest Rates – A High-Frequency
Identification. American Economic Review, 92(2): 90–95.
Connolly, E. and Kohler, M. (2004). News and Interest Rate Expectations: A Study of Six
Central Banks. RBA Research Discussion Papers 2004-10, Reserve Bank of Australia.
Cook, T. and Hahn, T. (1989). The Effect of Changes in the Federal Funds Rate Target on
Market Interest Rates in the 1970s. Journal of Monetary Economics, 24(3): 331–351.
Cox, J. ., Ingersoll Jr, J. E., and Ross, S. A. (1985). A Theory of the Term Structure of
Interest Rates. Econometrica, 53(2): 385–408.
De Santis, R. A. (2016). Impact of the Asset Purchase Programme on Euro Area Gov-
ernment Bond Yields Using Market News. ECB Working Paper No. 1939, European
Central Bank.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2016). The Macroeconomic Impact of Quantitative Easing in the
Euro Area. Monthly Report, June 2016.
Diebold, F. X. and Li, C. (2006). Forecasting the Term Structure of Government Bond
Yields. Journal of Econometrics, 130(2): 337–364.
Duffee, G. R. (2002). Term Premia and Interest Rate Forecasts in Affine Models. The
Journal of Finance, 57(1): 405–443.
Duffie, D. and Kan, R. (1996). A Yield-Factor Model of Interest Rates. Mathematical Fi-
nance, 6(4): 379–406.
Eberhart, R. and Kennedy, J. (1995). A New Optimizer Using Particle Swarm Theory.
In Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Micro Machine and Human Science,
1995, pages 39–43. IEEE.
European Central Bank (2014). Euro Area Risk-free Interest Rates: Measurement Issues,
Recent Developments and Relevance to Monetary Policy. Monthly Bulletin, July 2014.
Filipovic´, D. (1999). A Note on the Nelson–Siegel Family. Mathematical Finance, 9(4):
349–359.
Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., Sack, B., et al. (2011). The Financial Market Effects
of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases. International Journal of Central
Banking, 7(1): 3–43.
Galí, J. (2014). Monetary Policy and Rational Asset Price Bubbles. The American Economic
Review, 104(3): 721–752.
Galí, J. and Gambetti, L. (2015). The Effects of Monetary Policy on Stock Market Bubbles:
Some Evidence. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1): 233–257.
30
Gambetti, L. and Musso, A. (2017). The Macroeconomic Impact of the ECB’s Expanded
Asset Purchase Programme (APP). ECB Working Paper No. 2075, European Central
Bank.
Glick, R. and Leduc, S. (2012). Central Bank Announcements of Asset Purchases and the
Impact on Global Financial and Commodity Markets. Journal of International Money and
Finance, 31(8): 2078–2101.
Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., and Swanson, E. (2005). The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest
Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models. The
American Economic Review, 95(1): 425–436.
Joyce, M., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I., Tong, M., et al. (2011). The Financial Market Impact
of Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom. International Journal of Central Banking,
7(3): 113–161.
Kim, D. H. and Singleton, K. J. (2012). Term Structure Models and the Zero Bound: An
Empirical Investigation of Japanese Yields. Journal of Econometrics, 170(1): 32–49.
Kortela, T. (2016). A Shadow Rate Model with Time-Varying Lower Bound of Interest
Rates. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 19/2016, Bank of Finland.
Krippner, L. (2012). Modifying Gaussian Term Structure Models When Interest Rates Are
Near the Zero Lower Bound. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series
DP2012/02, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Krippner, L. (2013). A Tractable Framework for Zero Lower Bound Gaussian Term Struc-
ture Models. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP2013/02, Re-
serve Bank of New Zealand.
Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2011). The Effects of Quantitative Easing
on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 43(2): 215–287.
Kuttner, K. N. (2001). Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the
Fed Funds Futures Market. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3): 523–544.
Lemke, W. and Vladu, A. L. (2017). Below the Zero Lower Bound: A Shadow-Rate Term
Structure Model for the Euro Area. ECB Working Paper No. 1991, European Central
Bank.
Nardelli, S., Martens, D., and Tobback, E. (2017). Between Hawks and Doves: Measuring
Central Bank Communication. In IFC-Bank Indonesia Satellite Seminar on Big Data at the
ISI Regional Statistics Conference, 21 March, 2017, Bali, Indonesia, pages 1–12.
Nelder, J. A. and Mead, R. (1965). A Simplex Method for Function Minimization. The
Computer Journal, 7(4): 308–313.
Newey, W. and West, K. (1987). A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica, 55(3): 703–08.
Rigobon, R. (2003). Identification Through Heteroskedasticity. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 85(4): 777–792.
Rigobon, R. and Sack, B. (2004). The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices. Journal
31
of Monetary Economics, 51(8): 1553–1575.
Rogers, J. H., Scotti, C., and Wright, J. H. (2014). Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of
Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Multi-Country Review. Economic Policy, 29(80):
749–799.
Rosa, C. (2011). The Validity of the Event-study Approach: Evidence from the Impact of
the Fed’sMonetary Policy on US and Foreign Asset Prices. Economica, 78(311): 429–439.
Rosa, C. (2012). How ‘Unconventional’ are Large-Scale Asset Purchases? The Impact of
Monetary Policy on Asset Prices. Staff Reports 560, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Swanson, E. T. (2017). Measuring the Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance and
Asset Purchases on Financial Markets. NBER Working Paper No. 23311, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Thornton, D. L. et al. (2014). QE: Is There a Portfolio Balance Effect? Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, 96(1): 55–72.
Urbschat, F. and Watzka, S. (2017). Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area. CESIFO Work-
ing Paper No. 6709, IFO Institute.
Vasicek, O. (1977). An Equilibrium Characterization of the Term Structure. Journal of
Financial Economics, 5(2): 177–188.
Wright, J. H. (2012). What Does Monetary Policy Do to Long-Term Interest Rates at the
Zero Lower Bound? The Economic Journal, 122(564): F447–F466.
Wu, J. C. and Xia, F. D. (2016). Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy
at the Zero Lower Bound. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48(2-3): 253–291.
Wu, J. C. and Xia, F. D. (2017). Time-Varying Lower Bound of Interest Rates in Europe.
Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 17-06, The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business.
Wu, M. T. (2014). Unconventional Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest Rates. IMF
Working Paper 14/189, International Monetary Fund.
32
Table 6:APP-related statements
Date Event Statement related to APP
25.03.2014 Speech in Paris As such, I expect monetary policy to regain influence over the eco-
nomic cycle, and our accommodative stance to support a gradual
closing of the output gap in the coming years. This is reflected in
the current ECB staff projections, which foresee inflation rising to
1.0% in 2014, 1.3% in 2015 and 1.5% in 2016. If any downside risks
to this scenario appear, we stand ready to take additional mone-
tary policy measures that ensure our mandate is fulfilled. In other
words, we will do what is needed to maintain price stability.
03.04.2014 Press Conference (Q&A) I think you have rightly pointed to the key sentence in the statement:
"The Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to using
also unconventional instruments . . . " meaning that we havent fin-
ished with our conventional measures ". . . also unconventional in-
struments within its mandate in order to cope effectively with risks
of a too prolonged period of low inflation." So this statement says
that all instruments that fall within the mandate, including QE,
are intended to be part of this statement. During the discussion
we had today, there was indeed a discussion of QE.
24.04.2014 Speech in Amsterdam A third contingency would be a worsening of the medium-term out-
look for inflation. One cause for this could be by a broad-based
weakening of aggregate demand that derails our baseline scenario
of a moderate recovery. Another cause could be a substantial pos-
itive supply shock that, given the current low level of inflation,
loosens the anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. Un-
like the other contingencies, the objective here would not be to
defend the current stance, but rather to increase meaningfully the
degree of monetary accommodation. Hence, the limited margin
for manoeuvre that remains over short-term interest rates would
not be sufficient. This would be the context for a more broad-
based asset purchase programme.
26.05.2014 Speech in Sintra At the other end of the spectrum would be a too prolonged down-
ward departure of inflation and/or inflation expectations from our
projected baseline scenario, for example due to the interaction be-
tween exchange rate developments and medium-term inflation ex-
pectations as I explained earlier. This would call for a more ex-
pansionary stance, which would be the context for a broad-based
asset purchase programme.
07.08.2014 Press Conference Moreover, the Governing Council is unanimous in its commit-
ment to also using unconventional instruments within its mandate,
should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged
a period of low inflation. . .Our monetary policy stance remains,
and will remain, accommodative, and I can only reaffirm that the
Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to also use
unconventional measures, like ABS purchases, like QE, if our
medium-term outlook for inflation were to change.
22.08.2014 Speech in Jackson Hole Over the month of August financial markets have indicated that
inflation expectations exhibited significant declines at all hori-
zons. . .The Governing Council will acknowledge these develop-
ments and within its mandate will use all the available instru-
ments needed to ensure price stability over the medium term.
04.09.2014 Press Conference As our measures work their way through to the economy they will
contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to 2%. Should
it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a
period of low inflation, the Governing Council is unanimous in
its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments
within its mandate.
22.09.2014 Speech at the European Parliament The Governing Council remains fully determined to counter risks to
the medium-term outlook for inflation. Therefore, we stand ready
to use additional unconventional instruments within our man-
date, and alter the size and / or the composition of our unconven-
tional interventions should it become necessary to further address
risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation.
02.10.2014 Press Conference As all our measures work their way through to the economy they
will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to our
aim. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too
prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council is
unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional
instruments within its mandate.
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06.11.2014 Press Conference Should it become necessary to further address risks of too pro-
longed a period of low inflation, the Governing Council is unan-
imous in its commitment to using additional unconventional in-
struments within its mandate. The Governing Council has tasked
ECB staff and the relevant Eurosystem committees with ensuring
the timely preparation of further measures to be implemented, if
needed.
12.11.2014 Speech in Rome More recently, it has introduced a further three measures of uncon-
ventional monetary policy: the TLTROs, credit lines of up to four
years that can be used by banks for loans to households and busi-
nesses; two programmes for the purchase of covered bonds and
ABS with the aim being to further expand liquidity via operations
directed towards the real economy. All these policy actions, ac-
companied by the expected maintenance of interest rates at their
current level for a long period of time and an ongoing expansion
of the ECBs balance sheet, together with the commitment by the
Governing Council to take further unconventional policy actions
should medium-term inflation expectations worsen or if the mea-
sures already decided on prove to be insufficient, has led to an
unprecedented degree of monetary accommodation.
17.11.2014 Speech at the European Parliament If necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low
inflation, the Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to
using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. In
this context, we have also tasked relevant ECB staff and Eurosys-
tem committees with the timely preparation of further measures
to be implemented, if needed. Such measures could include fur-
ther changes to the size and composition of the Eurosystem bal-
ance sheet, if warranted to achieve price stability over themedium
term.
21.11.2014 Speech in Frankfurt However, once the margin for manoeuvre here becomes exhausted
that is, overnight and near-term money market rates are both at the
lower bound a third step becomes necessary. If further monetary
stimulus is needed, central banks need to by-pass the money mar-
ket and intervene directly in other asset markets to affect, through
prices and quantities, the various transmission channels of mon-
etary policy. Speaking in Amsterdam earlier this year, I clari-
fied the circumstances under which the ECB would need to resort
to asset purchases to increase meaningfully the degree of mon-
etary accommodation. In what I called the "third contingency",
I referred to a broad-based weakening of aggregate demand that
would threaten our baseline scenario of recovery and/or a loosen-
ing in the anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations.
04.12.2014 Press conference In the coming months, our measures will further ease the mone-
tary policy stance more broadly, support our forward guidance on
the key ECB interest rates and reinforce the fact that there are sig-
nificant and increasing differences in the monetary policy cycle
between major advanced economies. . . In this context, early next
year the Governing Council will reassess the monetary stimulus
achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet and the outlook for
price developments. . . Should it become necessary to further ad-
dress risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing
Council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional
unconventional instruments within its mandate. This would imply
altering early next year the size, pace and composition of our mea-
sures. In response to the request of the Governing Council, ECB staff
and the relevant Eurosystem committees have stepped up the tech-
nical preparations for further measures, which could, if needed, be
implemented in a timely manner.
02.01.2015 Interview with Handelsblatt We are making technical preparations to alter the size, pace and
composition of our measures in early 2015, should it become nec-
essary to further address risks of a too prolonged period of low
inflation. The Governing Council agrees unanimously on that.
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08.01.2015 Letter to the European Parliament Early this year, the Governing Council will reassess the monetary
stimulus achieved through the set of measures implemented in the
second half of 2014, the expansion of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet
achieved through these measures, and the outlook for price devel-
opments. Should it become necessary to further address risks of
too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council is
unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional
instruments within its mandate. . .Such measures may entail the
purchase of a variety of assets one of which could be sovereign
bonds, as mentioned in your letter.
15.01.2015 Interview with die Zeit Question: Are you talking about the thousand billion that you want
to spend over the next few years, predominantly by purchasing gov-
ernment bonds, and which is to be decided upon at the ECB over
the next week. Answer: I never said "thousand", but as guidance,
I mentioned the balance sheet size of the European Central Bank
at the beginning of 2012 (No denial) .
22.01.2015 Governing Council Decisions The ECB announces APP:
 ECB expands purchases to include bonds issued by euro
area central governments, agencies and European institu-
tions
 Combined monthly asset purchases to amount to e 60 bil-
lion
 Purchases intended to be carried out until at least Septem-
ber 2016
05.03.2015 Press conference Following up on our decisions of 22 January 2015, we will, on 9
March 2015, start purchasing euro-denominated public sector se-
curities in the secondary market.
15.04.2015 Press conference Purchases are intended to run until the end of September 2016
and, in any case, until we see a sustained adjustment in the path
of inflation that is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation
rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term . . . Purchases
are intended, intended, to run until the end of September 2016.
Some of you, when I first used the word intended, rather than ex-
pected, rightly pointed out the difference between the two concepts.
This was at the beginning of December last year, in an introductory
statement where we changed the word, and that was meant, and
was accepted bymarkets, as being a powerful signal of changing the
monetary policy. So, purchases are intended to run until the end of
September 2016, and in any case until we see a sustained adjustment
in the path of inflation that is consistent with our aim of achieving
inflation rates over etc etc, and then there is this new sentence ex-
plaining exactly what we mean by sustained and by medium-term.
I don’t think it’s the case now to go beyond this.
14.05.2015 Speech at the IMF While we have already seen a substantial effect of our measures on
asset prices and economic confidence, what ultimately matters is
that we see an equivalent effect on investment, consumption and
inflation. To that effect, we will implement in full our purchase
programme as announced and, in any case, until we see a sus-
tained adjustment in the path of inflation.
16.07.2015 Press conference Looking ahead, we will continue to closely monitor the situation in
financial markets, as well as the potential implications for the mon-
etary policy stance and for the outlook for price stability. If any fac-
tors were to lead to an unwarranted tightening of monetary policy,
or if the outlook for price stability were to materially change, the
Governing Council would respond to such a situation by using all
the instruments available within its mandate.
03.09.2015 Governing Council Decsions Draghi announces increase in APP issue share limit from 25% to
33%
23.09.2015 Speech at the European Parliament Should some of the downwards risks weaken the inflation out-
look over the medium term more fundamentally than we project
at present, we would not hesitate to act. The asset purchase pro-
gramme has sufficient in-built flexibility. We will adjust its size,
composition and duration as appropriate, if more monetary policy
impulse should become necessary.
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22.10.2015 Press conference Most notably, the strength and persistence of the factors that are
currently slowing the return of inflation to levels below, but close
to, 2% in the medium term require thorough analysis. In this con-
text, the degree ofmonetary policy accommodationwill need to be
re-examined at our December monetary policy meeting, when the
new Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections will be avail-
able. The Governing Council is willing and able to act by using
all the instruments available within its mandate if warranted in or-
der to maintain an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation.
In particular, the Governing Council recalls that the asset purchase
programme provides sufficient flexibility in terms of adjusting its
size, composition and duration.
03.11.2015 Speech in Frankfurt But even though domestic demand remains resilient, concerns
over growth prospects in emergingmarkets and other external fac-
tors are creating downside risks to the outlook for growth and
inflation. In this context, the degree of monetary policy accom-
modation will need to be re-examined at the Governing Council’s
December meeting. The Governing Council is willing and able to
act by using all the instruments available within its mandate if war-
ranted in order to maintain an appropriate degree of monetary ac-
commodation.
05.11.2015 Speech in Milan Today, like before, we are not constrained in our capacity to in-
tervene; we have many instruments at our disposal. We are con-
fronting a situation in which price dynamics are very weak and the
macroeconomic picture remains uncertain. That is why the Gov-
erning Council is committed to re-examining the degree of mone-
tary policy accommodation at its next meeting in December.
09.11.2015 Press release Increase in QE issue share limit from 25% to 33%
12.11.2015 Speech at the European Parliament From todays perspective, this suggests that a sustained normali-
sation of inflation could take longer than we anticipated in March
whenwe first appraised the overall impact of our measures. Wewill
closely monitor the risks to price stability and thoroughly assess the
strength and persistence of the factors that are slowing the return of
inflation to levels below, but close to, 2%. At our December mon-
etary policy meeting, we will re-examine the degree of monetary
policy accommodation.
20.11.2015 Speech in Frankfurt At our December Governing Council meeting, we will thoroughly
assess the strength and persistence of the factors that are slowing the
return of inflation towards 2%. . . If we conclude that the balance of
risks to our medium-term price stability objective is skewed to
the downside, we will act by using all the instruments available
within our mandate. In particular, we consider the APP to be a
powerful and flexible instrument, as it can be adjusted in terms
of size, composition or duration to achieve a more expansionary
policy stance.
03.12.2015 Press conference The ECB announces extension of APP until at least March 2017
04.12.2015 Speech in New York In the selection of our policy tools, we aim to minimise the extent
of such distortions, which is why, for instance, we have so far fo-
cused our asset purchases as much as possible in the most liquid
and generic asset classes. But there is no doubt that if we had to
intensify the use of our instruments to ensure that we achieve our
price stability mandate, we would. There cannot be any limit to
how far we arewilling to deploy our instruments, within ourman-
date, and to achieve our mandate.
14.12.2015 Speech in Bologna Following the Governing Council’s recalibration of our instruments
earlier this month, we expect inflation to reach our objective with-
out undue delay. But we continue to closely observe movements
in economic and financial conditions. As I said at the last Coun-
cil meeting, and again more recently, "there is no doubt that, if
we had to intensify the use of our instruments to ensure that we
achieve our price stability mandate, we would".
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21.01.2016 Press conference Yet, as we start the new year, downside risks have increased again
amid heightened uncertainty about emerging market economies’
growth prospects, volatility in financial and commodity markets,
and geopolitical risks. In this environment, euro area inflation dy-
namics also continue to be weaker than expected. It will there-
fore be necessary to review and possibly reconsider our monetary
policy stance at our next meeting in early March, when the new
staffmacroeconomic projections become availablewhichwill also
cover the year 2018.
22.01.2016 Speech in Davos We have plenty of instruments and especially we have the deter-
mination and willingness and capacity of the Governing Council
to act and deploy these instruments
01.02.2016 Speech at the European Parliament Since our meeting in early December, conditions have once more
changed. A moderate recovery of the euro area economy is under
way, driven mainly by domestic demand. But downside risks have
increased again amid heightened uncertainty about emerging mar-
ket economies’ growth prospects, volatility in financial and com-
modity markets, and geopolitical risks. Inflation dynamics are also
tangibly weaker than we expected in December. . .Therefore, at our
last meeting in January we judged that it will be necessary to re-
view and possibly reconsider our monetary policy stance at our
next monetary policy meeting in early March, when the new staff
macroeconomic projections become available.
15.02.2016 Speech at the European Parliament In order to make the euro area more resilient, contributions from all
policy areas are needed. The ECB is ready to do its part. As we
announced at the end of our last monetary policy meeting in Jan-
uary, the Governing Council will review and possibly reconsider
the monetary policy stance in early March.
01.03.2016 Letter to the European Parliament Regarding your questions on possible further monetary policy
measures, at its meeting in early March the Governing Council
will review and possibly reconsider its monetary policy stance.
There is good evidence that the monetary policy measures taken
since June 2014 areworking as intended. However, the review has to
be seen against the background of increased downside risks to the
earlier outlook amid heightened uncertainty about emerging mar-
ket economies’ growth prospects, volatility in the financial and com-
modity markets, and geopolitical risks. In this environment, euro
area inflation dynamics continue to be weaker than expected.
10.03.2016 Governing Council Decisions The ECB announces an increase in APP’s monthly purchase vol-
ume and adds Corporate Sector Purchase Programme to the APP:
 The monthly purchases under the APP will be expanded
to e 80 billion starting in April
 Investment grade euro-denominated bonds issued by
non-bank corporations established in the euro area will
be included in the list of assets that are eligible for reg-
ular purchases
21.04.2016 Press release The ECB reveals details of CSPP
02.06.2016 Governing Council Decisions The ECB announces the start of CSPP on 08 June 2016
08.09.2016 Press conference The Governing Council will continue to monitor economic and fi-
nancial market developments very closely. We will preserve the
very substantial amount of monetary support that is embedded in
our staff projections and that is necessary to secure a return of in-
flation to levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. If
warranted, we will act by using all the instruments available within
our mandate. Meanwhile, the Governing Council tasked the rele-
vant committees to evaluate the options that ensure a smooth im-
plementation of our purchase programme.
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20.10.2016 Press conference Looking ahead, we remain committed to preserving the very sub-
stantial degree of monetary accommodation which is necessary to
secure a sustained convergence of inflation towards levels below,
but close to, 2% over themedium term. To that end, wewill continue
to act, if warranted, by using all the instruments available within our
mandate. In December the Governing Council’s assessment will
benefit from the new staff macroeconomic projections extending
through to 2019 and from the work of the Eurosystem committees
on the options to ensure the smooth implementation of our pur-
chase programme until March 2017, or beyond, if necessary.
17.11.2016 Letter to the European Parliament The ECB does not hold prior meetings with corporations in the con-
text of private placements under the CSPP. The Eurosystem is not
involved in any ex ante discussions about the characteristics of
bonds it may be offered under the CSPP in the primary and sec-
ondary markets. Rather, all CSPP eligibility criteria are published
on the ECB website to allow all potential issuers to take them into
account.
21.11.2016 Speech at the European Parliament Supported by ourmonetary policy, the recovery is sustaining its mo-
mentum. We also expect headline inflation to continue rising over
the comingmonths. At the same time, we are not seeing a consistent
strengthening of underlying price dynamics. Much of the expected
increase will be driven by statistical factors related to the stabilisa-
tion of oil prices. Moreover, the return of inflation towards our
objective still relies on the continuation of the current, unprece-
dented level of monetary support, in spite of the gradual closing
of the output gap. It is for this reason that we remain committed to
preserving the very substantial degree of monetary accommodation
necessary to secure a sustained convergence of inflation towards
levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
28.11.2016 Speech at the European Parliament At our monetary policy meeting in December we’ll assess the var-
ious options that would allow the Governing Council to preserve
the very substantial degree ofmonetary accommodation necessary
to secure the sustained convergence of inflation towards levels be-
low but close to 2 percent over the medium term
30.11.2016 Interview with El Pais Question: In December, will QE be extended beyond March 2017
and the size of monthly purchases reduced? Answer: This is for
the Governing Council to decide and it will do so on December 8.
Right now, our latest introductory statement says that we remain
committed to preserving the very substantial degree of monetary
accommodation which is necessary to secure a sustained conver-
gence of inflation towards levels below, but close to, 2% over the
medium term.
08.12.2016 Governing Council Decisions The ECB announces tapering:
 The Governing Council decided to continue its purchases
under the APP at the current monthly pace of e 80 billion
until the end of March 2017
 From April 2017, the net asset purchases are intended to
continue at a monthly pace of e 60 billion until at least
December 2017
19.01.2017 Press Conference According to Eurostat, euro area annual HICP inflation increased
markedly from 0.6% in November 2016 to 1.1% in December. This
reflected mainly a strong increase in annual energy inflation,
while there are no signs yet of a convincing upward trend in un-
derlying inflation. . . However, measures of underlying inflation
are expected to rise more gradually over the medium term, sup-
ported by our monetary policy measures, the expected economic
recovery and the corresponding gradual absorption of slack.
03.02.2017 Letter to the European Parliament The asset purchase programme (APP) addresses the risks of too
long a period of low inflation and has not been designed to target
yield developments in individual euro area countries.
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09.03.2017 Press Conference "If warranted, to achieve its objective the Governing Council will
act by using all the instruments available within its mandate". You
remember from the previous introductory statement. That’s been
removed, basically, to signal that there is no longer that sense of
urgency in taking further actions while maintaining the accom-
modative monetary policy stance including the forward guidance.
But that urgency that was prompted by the risks of deflation isn’t
there; that was the judgement, the assessment of the Governing
Council.
21.04.2017 Speech in Washington While euro area headline inflation has increased markedly over the
past year, underlying inflation is expected to continue to remain
subdued. A very substantial degree of monetary accommodation
is still needed to secure a sustained return of inflation rates to-
wards levels below, but close to, 2% in line with the ECBs man-
date. . . The risks of deflation, defined as generalised price declines
that trigger a negative spiral of self-fulfilling expectations, have
largely disappeared. At the same time, underlying inflation has not
shown a convincing upward trend domestic cost pressures remain
subdued and recent increases in global price pressures have yet to
filter through.
27.04.2017 Press Conference Our monetary policy measures have continued to preserve the very
favourable financing conditions that are necessary to secure a sus-
tained convergence of inflation rates towards levels below, but close
to, 2% over the medium term. Incoming data since our meeting
in early March confirm that the cyclical recovery of the euro area
economy is becoming increasingly solid and that downside risks
have further diminished. At the same time, underlying inflation
pressures continue to remain subdued and have yet to show a con-
vincing upward trend.
10.05.2017 Speech in The Hague Incoming data confirm that the cyclical recovery of the euro area
economy is becoming increasingly solid and that downside risks
have further diminished.Nevertheless, it is too early to declare
success. Underlying inflation pressures continue to remain sub-
dued and have yet to show a convincing upward trend. . . Main-
taining the current very substantial degree of monetary accommo-
dation is still needed for underlying inflation pressures to build up
and support headline inflation in the medium term.
24.05.2017 Speech in Madrid When we introduced unconventional policy instruments in order to
secure a return of inflation towards our objective, we were aware
that those new instruments could result in somewhat more pro-
nounced side effects than conventional instruments. These side
effects have remained contained. . .Our current assessment of the
side effects suggest therefore that there is no reason to deviate
from the indications we have been consistently providing in the
introductory statement to our press conferences.
29.05.2017 Speech in the European Parliament Despite a firmer recovery, and looking through the volatile read-
ings in HICP inflation over recent months, underlying inflation
pressures have remained subdued. . .For domestic price pressures
to strengthen, we still need very accommodative financing con-
ditions, which are themselves dependent on a fairly substantial
amount of monetary accommodation. At its June monetary policy
meeting the Governing Council will receive an update of the staff
projections and a more complete information set on which it will be
able to formulate its judgement on the distribution of risks around
the most likely outlook for growth and inflation.
08.06.2017 Press conference The information that has become available since our last monetary
policy meeting in late April confirms a stronger momentum in the
euro area economy, which is projected to expand at a somewhat
faster pace than previously expected. We consider that the risks to
the growth outlook are now broadly balanced.At the same time,
the economic expansion has yet to translate into stronger inflation
dynamics. So far, measures of underlying inflation continue to
remain subdued.
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23.06.2017 Speech in Brussels In a presentation on the economy at a summit of the EU’s 28 leaders on Friday,
Draghi said the slow price growth meant that the banks accommodative policy
would stay as it is for now, an official with knowledge of Draghi’s remarks said.
Underlying inflation, the measure of price growth that excludes volatile unprocessed
food and energy costs, edged up to 1.2 percent year-on-year in April from 0.8 percent
in March, but then eased again to 1.0 percent in May. But Draghi said he expected
wage growth to pick up in coming months.
27.06.2017 Speech in Sinatra Deflationary forces have been replaced by reflationary ones. . .However, a consid-
erable degree of monetary accommodation is still needed for inflation dynamics to
become durable and self-sustaining. So for us to be assured about the return of infla-
tion to our objective, we need persistence in our monetary policy. . .As the economy
picks up we will need to be gradual when adjusting our policy parameters, so as
to ensure that our stimulus accompanies the recovery amid the lingering uncer-
tainties.
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